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REVENGE OF THE TRIPLE NEGATIVE: A 
NOTE ON THE BRANDEIS BRIEF IN 
MULLER v. OREGON 
Clyde Spillenger* 
The legal brief filed by Louis D. Brandeis and Josephine 
Goldmark in the case of Muller v. Oregon1-the original 
"Brandeis brief"- remains a landmark in American constitu-
tional lawyering. Of course, the brief, like the U.S. Supreme 
Court's own opinion in Muller, has not worn well with everyone. 
The Muller case was once regarded in conventional legal and 
constitutional histories as a ray of progressive light amidst the 
darkness of such decisions as Lochner and Adkins,3 and a tes-
tament to Brandeis's brilliant legal strategy; today legal scholars 
(particularly feminists and libertarians) are as likely to stress the 
paternalism (or "maternalism"), indeed the unvarnished sexism, 
of Justice Brewer's language concerning woman's distinctive role 
of discharging the "burdens of motherhood,"4 so as to promote 
"the future well-being of the race,"5 in his opinion upholding 
Oregon's maximum-hours law for laundresses. And the lengthy 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. My thanks to my col-
leagues Alison Anderson, Stuart Banner, Ann Carlson, Gary Rowe, and Bill Rubenstein. 
I. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding Oregon law limiting hours of work of women 
working in laundries to ten hours per day). 
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (declaring unconstitutional New 
York's law limiting the hours of work for bakery employees to sixty per week). Of 
course, a generation of "Lochner revisionism" has rendered the traditional account of so-
called "laissez-faire constitutionalism" largely obsolete. 
3. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional 
Congressional statute providing for establishment of minimum wage for women and 
children in the District of Columbia). 
4. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. 
5. /d. at 422. 
6. See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL 
5 
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presentation of statistical studies, public health reports, and 
other "social facts" in the Brandeis and Goldmark brief,7 while 
perhaps a bit more nuanced than Brewer's blunt opinion, largely 
prefigured Brewer's conclusions.8 Moreover, the brief is now re-
garded by many scholars as relying on a highly selective presen-
tation of "scientific" studies that by modern standards seem bi-
ased and amateurish.9 Nevertheless, I suspect that, as a landmark 
in constitutional-political advocacy, the brief retains much of its 
luster, or at least importance, for historians and legal scholars. 
Certainly the "Brandeis brief" has been, in many major cases, an 
important weapon in the arsenal of appellate litigators, and its 
immediate impact on the movement for protective labor legisla-
tion was considerable. 
RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 55--67 (1978); Nancy S. Erickson, Muller 
v. Oregon Reconsidered: The Origins of a Sex-Based Doctrine of Liberty of Contract, 30 
LAB. HIST. 228 (1989); David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1960, 1967-70 (2003) (reviewing JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, 
PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW, AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND 
NEW DEAL YEARS (2001) ). One fascinating index to the declining fortunes of the Muller 
decision is that in 1991, while striking down Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy as a 
violation of Title VII, the Supreme Court made a disparaging reference to Muller and the 
sexist presumptions underlying the decision. See UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 
U.S. 187, 211 (1991) ("Concern for a woman's existing or potential offspring historically 
has been the excuse for denying women equal employment opportunities.") (citing Mul-
ler, 208 U.S. at 412). See also Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulner-
ability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219 (1986), cited in Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187. 
Another feature of recent feminist consideration of Muller and the Brandeis brief has 
been increased recognition of the important role played by Josephine Goldmark, 
Brandeis's sister-in-law (and, to a lesser extent, Florence Kelley), in compiling the brief, 
particularly in tracking down the numerous studies on which the brief relies. See NANCY 
WOLOCH, MULLER V. OREGON: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 29 (1996); 
NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN, supra, at 82; OWEN M. FISS, 
8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS 
OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 at 175 (1993). 
7. The text of the brief can be found at The Brandeis Brief, http://library.touisville. 
edullaw/brandeislmuller.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006), and at Women in Industry, 
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/ww/organizations-ncl.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). See also 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS & JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 113 (Arno Press 
1969) (1908); 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63-178 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard 
Casper eds., 1975). Each of these versions are photostat copies of the original brief. The 
brief is also generously excerpted in WOLOCH, supra note 6, at 109-33, although its final 
paragraph is not included in that excerpt. 
8. For an early example of criticism of the gender stereotypes invoked by the Mul-
ler brief, see KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 88 & n.38 (1970). 
9. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social 
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91, 106 & n.63 (1993) (ar-
guing that the Muller brief would be regarded today as "junk social science"). Rustad 
and Koenig, whose real quarry is elsewhere, hasten to add that Brandeis's brief should 
nevertheless be praised for breaking the formalist mold in constitutional argument. See 
also FISS, supra note 6, at 179 (calling the brief a "hodgepodge" of studies). 
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Let's turn for a moment to the brief itself. I ask the reader 
to examine Brandeis's concluding paragraph: 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that in view of the facts above set forth and of 
legislative action extending over a period of more than sixty 
years in the leading countries of Europe, and in twenty of our 
States, it cannot be said that the Legislature of Oregon had no 
reasonable ground for believing that the public health, safety, 
or welfare did not require a legal limitation on women's work 
in manufacturing and mechanical establishments and laun-
dries to ten hours in one day. 
See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395, 397. 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 
Counsel for State of Oregon. 
Unless I miss my guess, you probably have found it necessary to 
read this passage a second or perhaps even a third time. 
I think most lawyers would agree that this was not the ideal 
way of concluding one of the most important briefs ever to be 
filed in the U.S. Supreme Court. It's a pretty long sentence, and 
residing within it is a formidable triple negative. It evokes the 
question H.L. Mencken asked after reciting a passage from War-
ren G. Harding's inaugural address: "What on earth does it 
mean?" 10 It is hard to believe that a reputable law firm today 
would allow such a brief in a major U.S. Supreme Court case to 
leave the office for the printer without first ensuring that that fi-
nal paragraph had been subdued and domesticated. It is true 
that Brandeis's innovative strategy in his Muller brief was to 
subordinate the legal argument to exposition of the "social 
facts"; but that strategy had not previously been thought to en-
tail making the legal argument's ultimate conclusion unintelligi-
ble. {Of course, some literary critics might find this a rather 
clever way of making the larger proto-Realist point, performa-
10. H.L. Mencken, Gamalielese, in THE IMPOSSIBLE H.L. MENCKEN: A SELECTION 
OF HIS BEST NEWSPAPER STORIES 410 (Marion Elizabeth Rodgers ed., 1991) (emphasis 
added). The particular phrase in Harding's speech to which Mencken was referring was 
"(t]he expressed conscience of progress." 
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tively rather than propositionally, that the internal coherence of 
legal doctrine is largely a mirage. But it goes without saying that 
the austere Brandeis lacked both the playfulness and the "law-
skepticism" to have entertained such a notion, much less incor-
porate it in a Supreme Court brief.) 
You've probably noticed already that the real allure of 
Brandeis's concluding paragraph is not its overall impenetrabil-
ity but the fact that, when all the dust has settled, it ends up ar-
guing something like the opposite of what the brief's 100 pages 
of often laborious social science were supposed to be building to. 
Granted, it's not literally the opposite; Brandeis, very much to 
his credit, does not in this passage actually invite the Court to 
strike down Oregon's law. However, according to its syntax, the 
passage does attribute to the State of Oregon, Brandeis's (pre-
sumably surprised and unamused) client, the view that regula-
tion of laundresses' working hours was unnecessary, and argues 
strenuously (if somewhat chaotically) that such a view was rea-
sonable. The contention that Oregon might reasonably (and thus 
constitutionally) refrain from regulating those hours would have 
provoked little disagreement from the Court, but it does sit un-
easily with the remainder of the brief.'' 
It may be frivolous even to speculate as to whether this 
eleventh-hour subversion of the logic of Brandeis's entire argu-
ment should be attributed to anything other than simple error, 
produced perhaps by the shortness of time or too many late 
nights at the office. But this won't take long. Thus, for example, 
Brandeis does seem to have taken a sardonic view of the fact 
that so much effort was required to convince the Court of the 
constitutionality of the Oregon statute-in private he remarked 
that the brief should have been entitled "What Any Fool 
Knows"12 -but it seems unlikely that that sense of irritation 
would have led him to conclude his brief on a strange and sour 
note of sarcasm: "It's entirely reasonable for Oregon to believe 
that no legal regulation of the hours of laundresses is necessary. 
Yeah, right. [Rolling of eyes.]" 
II. The thrust of Brandeis's legal argument was, of course, quite clear from its 
statement in the briefs opening pages. See pp. 9-10 of the brief, available in any of the 
sources for the brief identified supra note 7 ("[T]here is reasonable ground for holding 
that to permit women in Oregon to work in a 'mechanical establishment, or factory, or 
laundry' more than ten hours in one day is dangerous to the public health, safety, morals, 
or welfare")-still not ideal as a statement of the legal proposition, perhaps, but enough 
to get the message across. 
12. DEAN ACHESON, MORNING AND NOON 53 (1965). 
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Alternatively, did Brandeis think that by means of his last 
sentence, he might send a subliminally soothing message to those 
members of the Court who had little patience with protective la-
bor regulation, thus putting them in a better mood about reach-
ing the result Brandeis desired? Or was he throwing sand in their 
eyes, sowing just enough confusion to lead them, in desperation, 
to decide in his client's favor? Doubtful. 
Perhaps the brief's conclusion was a gesture in the direction 
of Holmes, who after all had famously written that the life of the 
law has not been logic. Unfortunately for this interpretation, 
Holmes had not concluded his aphorism by saying, "Rather, the 
life of the law has been the introduction by lawyers of incoher-
ence into the structure of their arguments." 
Finally, did Brandeis himself harbor a subconscious ambiva-
lence about the position he was arguing, leading him to subvert 
its thrust in his very last sentence? As satisfying as this supposi-
tion might be to psycho-historians, there is nothing in the record 
to validate it, and much to refute it. Theorists of deconstruction 
have often spoken of the self-subverting qualities of language, 
but usually they are referring to the properties of indeterminacy 
immanent in language itself, and not the phenomenon of an au-
thor suddenly and unaccountably saying the opposite of what he 
has been saying. 
No, that last paragraph was just a mistake, as a cigar is often 
just a cigar. At all events, the mistake seems to have had no ef-
fect on anyone, either the Justices themselves or the generations 
of scholars who have written about Muller and the Brandeis 
brief (none of whom seems previously to have noted, or at least 
called attention to, the error). 13 The overall thrust of Brandeis's 
argument was known to all, and most readers of the brief, then 
and now, have undoubtedly passed quickly over its final para-
graph, transiently flustered by its density but with no real need 
to parse it for greater understanding. Brandeis's oral argument 
before the Court would in any case have swept away any ambi-
guities created by his brief. 
13. After a literature review that was something more than cursory and something 
less than exhaustive, I have found no previous reference to the error in the briefs final 
paragraph. At least three studies have quoted that paragraph without noting the error. 
WOLOCH, supra note 6, at 31 (noting the triple negative but not mentioning its logical 
error); LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF AMERICA'S 
TRULY GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 165 (1983) (quoting the paragraph without 
comment); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 115 (1984). 
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Still, legal historians and law teachers may now have added 
reason to attend to the brief in their work. Teachers of appellate 
advocacy can point to it not only as a landmark in the use of so-
ciological data in appellate briefs, but also as an object lesson in 
how not to conclude a brief and in the vital importance of careful 
proofreading; nothing engages and consoles law students more 
than a demonstration that even celebrated lawyers are capable 
of silly and avoidable mistakes. At the same time, historians and 
students of Brandeis now have further reason (albeit a minor 
one) to complicate their accounts of the brief in Muller and to 
show that Isaiah, too, was quite capable of nodding (perhaps lit-
erally, in the early morning hours before the brief was due). And 
the fact that most people seem to have read the last paragraph as 
being consistent with the rest of the brief-obviously we cannot 
know this for everyone who has ever read it-confirms the views 
of many cognitive psychologists as to the way in which we read 
and comprehend. Or that lots of people are doing lots of skim-
mmg. 
Further commentary on this episode would be gratuitous. 
But one might hazard a final observation: It cannot be said that 
Brandeis had no reasonable basis for not concluding his brief the 
way he did. 
